Peace talks are supposed to provide a platform for addressing the underlying causes of conflict. Yet, despite a similar starting point, peace negotiations can follow drastically different trajectories. Why? This article argues that the selection of the negotiation framework is a key causal factor. It may be shaped by regime type, a government’s political ideology and underlying constraints faced by negotiating actors. The selection of the framework is also influenced by how conflicts are understood, and how “peace” is perceived to be achieved.
A common misperception is that no fighting equals peace, or that a peace agreement will end violence and suffering almost instantly. This is not true, and a peace process can still be painful and time-consuming.
The choice of the negotiation framework is a key decision at the onset of peace negotiations. It sets a tone for the process and allows negotiating parties to shape expectations of each other’s behavior. For example, a Colombian negotiation framework legislated guidelines for identifying negotiating parties and issues, publicized all partial agreements and the disagreements that occurred throughout the negotiations, included third party mediators and enabled nonbinding civil society participation. In contrast, a Turkish negotiation framework provided immunity from prosecution to government negotiators, excluded all third-party mediators and permitted only limited, conditional civil society participation.
The difference in the negotiating frameworks in Colombia and Turkey led to divergent outcomes. Both negotiations suffered from the ubiquity of spoilers, whose personal and organizational interests fueled criticisms and sabotage of the negotiations. In addition, exogenous shocks – corruption scandals, economic downturns, cross-border violence and other events – undermined the legitimacy of the negotiations and threatened their success.